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I. INTRODUCTION
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 changed the
terms of Federal Reserve participation in the inter-
bank clearing market. It required services? which
had previously been made available free of charge to
Federal Reserve member banks, to be priced com-
petitively and made available to all depository in-
stitutions on equal terms. This article explains why
Congress legislated this change. To do this, the
article investigates the origins of the debate over the
Federal Reserve’s role in the payments system that
arose in the decade preceding the enactment of this
legislation.
Two principal issues surfaced as part of this larger
debate; namely, Federal Reserve access and pricing
policies. The first dealt with the terms of access
to Federal Reserve payments services. Debate over
this issue arose as a result of thrift industry deregu-
lation. To make use of new transaction account
powers, thrifts requested access to the Federal Re-
serve’s clearing network. The industry was granted
indirect access to some Federal Reserve services, but
not always on the same terms as those enjoyed by
commercial banks. Subsequent thrift industry de-
mands for a nondiscriminatory access policy were
supported by the Justice Department’s Antitrust Di-
vision, and finally resulted in congressional action to
institute such a policy.
Pricing policy dealt with the pricing of Federal Re-
serve services. Debate over this issue arose for three
reasons. First, since the Federal Reserve did not
price its services explicitly, an expansion of its ser-
vice offerings in the 1970s raised concerns among
market participants that private sector competition
in these new areas could be preempted. Second, mea-
sures then under consideration by Congress to end
the Federal Reserve’s increasingly serious member-
ship problem were expected to result in a consider-
able loss of revenue to the U.S. Treasury. Pricing
was adopted to mitigate this revenue loss. Third, a
nondiscriminatory pricing policy was essential to the
resolution of the access policy issue. The pricing
provisions of the Monetary Control Act effectively
resolved all of these issues.
This article is organized as follows. Section II dis-
cusses the origins of the debate over granting non-
member institutions direct access to Federal Reserve
services. In this discussion, attention is focused on
thrift industry deregulation as a driving force behind
the debate over access policy. Section III reviews
the debate over issues related to Federal Reserve
pricing. Section IV presents a summary of the article
and some concluding comments.
II. ACCESS TO FEDERAL RESERVE SERVICES
Before the Monetary Control Act was passed,
member banks obtained most payments services from
the Federal Reserve. As a result of the Federal
Reserve’s expansion of its Regional Check Process-
ing Centers (RCPCs) in the early 1970s, many
privately-operated clearinghouses c1osed.
1 Nonmem-
ber banks therefore tended to rely on correspondents,
1 
Many of the regional clearinghouses that closed when
the Federal Reserve expanded its RCPC system have
reopened since Federal Reserve pricing was initiated in
1981. In addition, there has been new entry into this
market as a result of pricing. See Joanna H. Frodin,
“Fed Pricing and the Check Collection Business: Private
Sector Response,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Business Review  (January/February 1984), pp. 13-21.
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serve, to clear checks and for other payments ser-
vices. These correspondents were permitted to “pass
through” their respondents’ checks to the Fed and
also to resell other services such as the wire transfer
of funds over Fedwire, the Federal Reserve’s elec-
tronic funds transfer network. In this way, non-
member banks were able to gain indirect access to
Federal Reserve services.
When thrift institutions first began to offer limited
third-party payments services, they needed access to
a clearing network. A newly organized automated
clearinghouse (ACH) system, designed to handle the
electronic transfer of recurring payments from trans-
actions deposits held with banks, appeared to be
ideally suited to the limited powers initially granted
to thrifts. Access to this system was controlled by
the commercial banking industry, however, and
bankers demanded regulatory reform that would
eliminate much of the special treatment enjoyed by
thrifts as the price of direct access. Thus, the ques-
tion of access was linked to the broader issues deal-
ing with the regulatory reform of the financial ser-
vices industry. To complicate matters further, the
Federal Reserve had assumed a major role in the
operation of the ACH network. This operational
role subsequently involved it in the ensuing debate
over access policy.
Thrift industry deregulation and regulatory re-
form of the financial services industry constituted key
issues in the debate over ACH access policy. Their
importance necessitates a brief review of these is-
sues. This is followed by a detailed review of the
debate over thrift industry access to the ACH net-
work. The response of the commercial banking in-
dustry and the Federal Reserve to these events is
examined. Finally, the role of the Justice Depart-
ment in resolving the debate over access policy is
explained.
Deregulation and the Entry of Thrift
Institutions into the Payments System
The U. S. financial regulatory structure that
emerged from the Great Depression was designed to
prevent a recurrence of the financial chaos experi-
enced in that episode. The prevailing view then was
that excessive competition among financial institu-
tions contributed to instability in financial markets.
Accordingly, the resulting laws and regulations were
intentionally designed to limit competition. Restric-
tions on interest rates paid to depositors acted to
limit competition among all financial institutions,
while other rules limited the range of activities per-
mitted for financial institutions. These rules placed
each institution into a distinct category (for example,
thrift institutions or commercial banks), and then
restricted the activities permitted for firms in each
category.
Within this scheme, making commercial loans and
accepting demand deposits were activities relegated
to commercial banks and prohibited to federally in-
sured thrifts. The latter were to specialize in gather-
ing consumer time deposits and extending mortgage
loans. To help them attract such deposits, Regula-
tion Q gave thrifts a slight competitive advantage in
the form of somewhat higher interest rate ceilings
than those imposed on commercial banks.
Until the late 1960s, this regulatory structure ap-
peared to work more or less as its architects had in-
tended. Most thrifts were able to operate profitably
by borrowing money at relatively low, short-term in-
terest rates while acquiring mortgage loans which
paid higher, long-term rates. Because of interest rate
regulation, the increased fluctuations in interest rates
that began in the late 1960s resulted in severe dis-
intermediation in the thrift industry. This disinter-
mediation created funding problems for the industry
as a whole. As a result, many thrifts became in-
terested in diversifying their operations into new
areas with the hope of restoring profitability.
Congress did not begin to deal with these issues
comprehensively until the passage of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 (DIDMCA) and the Garn-St.Germain Act
of 1982. However, the events of the decade preced-
ing the enactment of these measures conspired to
bring about a process of piecemeal deregulation
driven by underlying market forces.
2 To help its
members attract deposits and thereby mitigate the
2 
Detailed accounts of the events of this period and the
debate that accompanied the financial industry deregula-
tion are available in Thomas F. Huertas, “The Regulation
of Financial Institutions: A Historical Perspective on
Current Issues,” in George J. Benston, ed.,  Financial
Services: The Changing Institutions and Government
Policy (Prentice-Hall, 1983), chap. 1, and also in Almarin
Phillips and Donald P. Jacobs, “Reflections on the Hunt
Commission,” ibid., chap. 9.
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Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) authorized federally-
chartered savings and loans to permit preauthorized,
nonnegotiable third-party transfers from consumers’
savings accounts for household-related expenses in
1970. These rules were further liberalized in 1975 to
permit such transfers for any purpose.
The New England states acted more aggressively
to help their state-chartered thrifts attract deposits.
In 1972, state-chartered mutual savings banks in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire were permitted
to begin offering NOW accounts. These deposits
were, for all practical purposes, interest-bearing
checking accounts. In response, Congress granted all
depository institutions in these two states similar au-
thority in 1974. This authority was later extended
to depository institutions in all the New England
states in 1976.
3 Thrifts and other financial institu-
tions nationwide were not permitted to offer interest-
bearing checkable deposits until 1980, when the
DIDMCA was passed.
To make use of these new powers, thrifts needed
increased access to the nation’s payments system. In
New England, the Federal Reserve agreed to process
and clear NOW account drafts for thrifts on terms
similar to those extended to nonmember commercial
banks. On a national level, the thrift industry be-
came interested in acquiring access to the newly de-
veloping system of automated clearinghouses. The
eventual resolution of this issue provides an interest-
ing case study in antitrust law. Understanding the is-
sues that were debated, however, requires some
knowledge of the unique aspects of the automated
clearinghouse system’s organizational structure.
The Organization of Automated
Clearinghouses
An automated clearinghouse, or ACH, is a com-
puterized facility that performs basically the same
functions as an ordinary clearinghouse. Rather than
processing and sorting paper checks, however, an
automated clearinghouse processes payments infor-
mation stored on magnetic tapes and transmitted
over a telecommunications network.
3 
Alfred Broaddus, “Automatic Transfers from Savings
to Checking: Perspective and Prospects.” Federal Re-
serve Bank-of Richmond,  Economic Review  64 (Novem-
ber/December 1978) : 3-13, contains a detailed chronology
of innovations in third-party payment services during this
period.
Automated clearinghouses in the United States
were developed through the cooperative efforts of
commercial banks and the Federal Reserve System.
These efforts began in 1968, when the Special Com-
mittee on Paperless Entries (SCOPE) was created
by a group of California banks to study alternative
means of reducing the volume of paper checks pro-
cessed by banks. That same year the American
Bankers Association (ABA) created the Monetary
and Payments System (MAPS) Planning Commit-
tee, which subsequently recommended the forma-
tion of a national system of automated clearing-
houses.
With some assistance from the Federal Reserve,
SCOPE completed the development of a computer
software package and a set of operating rules in
1972. The California Automated Clearinghouse As-
sociation (CACHA) was formed that same year and
was the first automated clearinghouse in the United
States. In response to a formal request from
CACHA, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco agreed to provide the necessary clearing and
settlement facilities and assumed responsibility for
operating the automated clearinghouse. These ser-
vices were made available at no explicit charge to all
banks that were members of CACHA.
Over the next several years, the number of re-
gional ACHs grew rapidly. In virtually every case,
Federal Reserve Banks assumed responsibility for
operating these facilities. The first privately op-
erated ACH was not formed until December 1975,
when the New York ACH (NYACH) began opera-
tion. Today there are over 30 separate ACH as-
sociations in operation in the United States; most
continue to be operated by the Federal Reserve.
4 The
regional automated clearinghouses are linked to-
gether by a nationwide telecommunications network,
also operated by the Federal Reserve.
5
4 
Norman Penny and Donald I. Baker,  The Law of Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer, (Boston: Warren, Gorham, and
Lamont, Inc., 1980). Chapter 3 contains a history of the
development of automated clearinghouses in the United
States.
5 
This nationwide ACH network was completed in 1978.
As with the regional automated clearinghouses, the na-
tionwide network was organized through the joint efforts
of the banking industry and the Federal Reserve. Further
details may be found in Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, “Nationwide EFT Network,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin  64 (October 1978): 823-24.
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sponsibility for managing the routine operations of
most of the newly organized automated clearing-
houses, the ACH associations themselves were gov-
erned by rules adopted by their member institutions.
Association rules not only governed routine opera-
tions, but also dealt with the more fundamental ques-
tions concerning organizational structure such as the
terms of membership and conditions imposed on
access to services. These rules permitted all com-
mercial banks (including banks that were not mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System) access on equal
terms. Banks that were not members of the Federal
Reserve System were required to maintain accounts
with member banks for purposes of settlement, how-
ever, since nonmember institutions did not keep
reserves with Reserve Banks.
When the development of an electronic alterna-
tive to the existing system of clearing paper checks
was initiated in 1968, the question of whether thrifts
should participate in such a system was not an issue
since most thrifts could not then offer deposits with
third-party payment powers. This had changed by
the time CACHA began to operate in 1972, however,
because of the FHLBB’s 1970 rule and the advent of
NOW accounts in New England.
The California Savings and Loan League ap-
proached CACHA in the summer of 1972 to inquire
about the possibility of participation in the newly
formed ACH. Subsequently, several savings and loan
associations applied for membership in CACHA.
At first, thrifts expressed an interest only in receiv-
ing ACH credits (such as automatic payroll de-
posits) and debits originated by others. After some
negotiation, CACHA offered to permit thrifts to
establish “pass-through” accounts with banks that
were members of the ACH. Membership in the
ACH on the same terms as commercial banks, how-
ever, was denied. This meant that thrifts wishing to
originate ACH transactions were required to deal
with a correspondent bank, which would initiate
transactions on their behalf. This proposal was con-
sistent with the ABA’s recommended access policy.
Banking Industry Policy on ACH Access
The ABA’s proposed policy on ACH access for
thrifts was similar to the “pass-through” policy
adopted by the Federal Reserve in response to earlier
requests for access to its check-clearing system by
New England thrifts. In the latter case, thrifts
were permitted to establish pass-through clearing ac-
counts (amounting to three percent of their NOW
account deposits) with a Federal Reserve member
bank, which would then clear checks and NOW ac-
count drafts through the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston on their behalf. This policy gave New Eng-
land thrifts access to check-clearing services on the
same terms as those extended to nonmember banks.
6
In contrast, the ABA’s policy treated all com-
mercial banks alike, while imposing different condi-
tions on thrifts. In retrospect, this difference in the
two policies was a crucial one. Apparently thrifts
were willing to accept a pass-through access policy
when that same policy was uniformly imposed on
nonmember banks. In the case of automated clear-
inghouses, thrifts claimed that the banking industry’s
discriminatory access policy put them at a competi-
tive disadvantage.
To the banking industry the issue of ACH access
was intimately tied to the broader issues of thrift in-
dustry deregulation and, more generally, to regula-
tory reform of the financial services industry. The
rationale for the existing regulatory structure, which
treated thrifts more leniently in several important
respects, was based on the premise  that thrift insti-
tutions were not permitted to compete in certain tra-
ditional banking markets. Bankers viewed the thrift
industry’s attempts to gain direct access to ACH ser-
vices as an attempt to circumvent the legal restric-
tions that prohibited thrifts from offering demand
deposits. In addition, they argued that their industry
had borne the cost of developing the ACH system,
and that the thrift industry was attempting to gain
a “free ride” as a result of these efforts.’
The ABA did not completely rule out equal ac-
cess to the ACH system. However, it demanded
equal regulatory treatment of thrifts, including the
imposition of more stringent reserve requirements
(such as those imposed on banks) and the abolition
of the more favorable interest rate ceilings enjoyed
by thrifts under Regulation Q, as the price of such
access. Direct access to ACH facilities for thrifts
6 
See Penny and Baker,  The Law of Electronic Funds
Transfer  at 19-7.
7 
Penny and Baker at 19-26.
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posed “. . . unless authorized through legislative re-
structuring of the nation’s financial system and
equalization of regulatory and reserve obligations
have been achieved.“
8
Federal Reserve Policy on ACH Access
The Federal Reserve became involved in the de-
bate over ACH access because of the major role it
had assumed in the operation of that system. Thrifts,
unable to secure access on the terms they desired
from the ACH associations, appealed to both the
Federal Reserve and Congress to grant them direct
access to these systems. Initially the Federal Re-
serve supported the banking industry’s proposed ac-
cess policy, citing essentially the same concerns as
those expressed by the bankers. Congress took no
formal action during the early stages of the debate,
but appeared to agree with the Federal Reserve’s
position.
Like the banking industry, the Federal Reserve
viewed ACH transactions as a substitute for paper
checks. By law, banks were prohibited from paying
explicit interest on demand deposits. The Board
expressed concern that permitting thrifts direct ac-
cess to the ACH system, including the authority to
directly originate ACH transactions, could under-
mine legal restrictions prohibiting the payment of in-
terest on demand deposits. It therefore argued that
only those institutions explicitly authorized by Con-
gress to offer demand deposits should be permitted
direct access to the ACH system. Representative
Ferdinand St. Germain of the House Banking Com-
mittee appears to have shared this view.
9
In 1973, commercial banks had not yet received
authority to originate preauthorized, third-party
payments from customers’ savings accounts such as
that granted earlier to federally-chartered savings
and loans. This meant that customers of commercial
8 
“Fed Urged to Move Cautiously on EFTS; Many See
Dangers to Private Competition,”  American Banker,
April 9, 1974. This article also summarizes the comments
of a great many other interested parties, including thrift
industry groups, on the issues of pricing and access to the
automated clearinghouse network. The views expressed
by CACHA on this issue mirrored those of the ABA.
9 
See comments of Rep. Ferdinand St. Germain, in  Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer System (EFTS)/Failure of the
U. S. National Bank of San Diego,  Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 93 Cong. 1
Sess. (GPO, 1974), p. 26.
banks were required to originate ACH payments
from non-interest-bearing checking accounts. A cus-
tomer of a federally-chartered thrift, however, could
originate such payments directly from a savings ac-
count. The ban on direct access did not prohibit
thrifts from offering this service to their customers,
but the banking industry apparently felt that permit-
ting thrifts direct access under existing regulations
would give them a greater competitive advantage in
this area. The Federal Reserve Board, facing an
acute membership problem and therefore aware of
member banks’ perceptions of unequal and unfair
regulation, viewed thrifts’ newly acquired third-party
payments powers as a breach in existing regulations,
and did not wish to ratify the existence of this “loop-
hole” by helping the thrift industry gain direct access
to ACH services. In the end, however, competitive
pressures led to the extension of similar authority to
commercial banks, while thrifts gained even greater
powers.
10
As a long-run solution to the problem of thrift ac-
cess, the Federal Reserve proposed reforms that
would place thrifts on a more equal competitive foot-
ing with commercial banks. As part of these re-
forms, legislation that would permit thrifts to join
the Federal Reserve System was proposed. Under
this plan, thrifts that joined the Federal Reserve
would be granted direct access to all the System’s
payments services. Thrifts that became members
would also be required to bear all the costs of mem-
bership, however, such as meeting the same reserve
requirements imposed on member banks. Until such
legislation was enacted, the access policy proposed
by the banking industry was viewed as an adequate
short-term solution. The following statement by
Governor George M. Mitchell of the Federal Reserve
Board summarizes the Board’s policy:
If Congress said, we want all the institutions to be
part of the money system, then there wouldn’t be
any question about it. You know what the argu-
ments are for making them more like banks, giving
them the same reserve requirements and giving
them the same interest rate ceiling arrangements-
that is essentially what we are talking about.
11
10 
Commercial banks were first permitted to make pre-
authorized, nonnegotiable third-party transfers from cus-
tomers’ savings accounts in September of 1975, five
months after the FHLBB further liberalized similar
third-party transfer powers for federally-chartered
savings and loans. Once again, see Broaddus, “Auto-
mated Transfers from Savings to Checking.”
11 
Electronic Funds Transfer System,  Hearings, p. 30.
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posals were also intended to provide a means of re-
covering the added costs of servicing thrifts under a
policy of direct access. Giving thrifts access on the
same terms as banks would require the Federal Re-
serve to bear the cost of servicing additional end
points on its ACH system. Setting explicit fees for
ACH services offered a means of recovering the
added cost of servicing thrifts directly, but the thrift
industry argued that any fees should be imposed uni-
formly on all institutions receiving ACH services.
The increasing seriousness of the Federal Reserve’s
membership problem made the Board reluctant to
charge its member banks for payments services.
It was widely acknowledged that the Federal Re-
serve’s membership problem was due to the cost of
the non-interest-bearing reserves member banks were
required to hold. In contrast, nonmember banks and
thrifts faced less stringent reserve requirements
which could often be satisfied by holding certain
interest-bearing bonds (most commonly, state or fed-
eral government bonds). Since the Federal Reserve
was effectively prohibited from paying explicit in-
terest on reserves, it offered payments services to its
members at no explicit charge as a means of paying
implicit interest. As inflation and interest rates rose
throughout this period, however, the cost to banks
of maintaining required reserves rose and banks
began to withdraw from the System at an increasing
rate.
12
From the Federal Reserve’s perspective, imposing
explicit fees for payments services would amount to
double-charging its members for services already
paid for by holding required reserves. In addition to
being viewed as being unfair, it was feared that the
adoption of such a pricing policy would further ex-
acerbate the System’s membership problem.
13
Thrift industry groups, on the other hand, opposed
the Federal Reserve’s proposals for regulatory  re-
form and expanded membership. Instead, these
groups put forward proposals to impose equal access
charges on both thrifts and commercial banks while
opposing any reforms that would extend the same
regulatory treatment faced by commercial banks to
their own industry.
14
To summarize, then, the Federal Reserve Board
supported the banking industry’s pass-through access
proposals for thrifts until such time as those institu-
tions received explicit authority from Congress to
offer transactions accounts to the public. Any
explicit extension of such authority to thrifts was
expected to be accompanied by other regulatory re-
forms that would place thrifts and commercial banks
on a more equal competitive footing. Additionally,
the Federal Reserve proposed that thrifts be per-
mitted to obtain membership in the System as a
means of gaining direct access to its clearing net-
work. The thrift industry, however, was more in-
terested in gaining direct access to the ACH system
than in regulatory reform, and vigorously opposed
these proposals. Instead, industry representatives
argued that thrifts should be granted immediate ac-
cess on the same terms as commercial banks without’
regard to the resolution of the regulatory issues that
concerned both the banking industry and the Federal
Reserve. The thrift industry subsequently received
aid from the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice
Department in arguing its case.
12 
During this period, the Federal Reserve repeatedly
expressed concerns that the continuing withdrawal of its
members would make it more difficult to conduct mone-
tary policy. One notable concern in this respect was that
diminished access to the Federal Reserve’s discount
window (which was then largely limited to member
banks) might hamper the Fed’s ability to deal effectively
with a financial crisis. See, for example, “Statement by
William E. Miller, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, before the Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representa-
tives, July 27, 1978,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 64
(August 1978): 636-42. Other writers have stressed the
potential loss of revenues earned from the non-interest-
bearing reserves member banks were required to hold as
the primary reason for concern over the membership
problem. This latter view is adopted by Marvin Good-
friend and Monica Hargraves, “A Historical Assessment
of the Rationales and Functions of Reserve Require-
ments,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic
Review  69 (March/April 1983): 3-21.
Access Policy and Antitrust Law
The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division sided
with the thrift industry in the debate over the issues
of access and pricing, arguing that any access policy
that treated thrifts differently from banks violated
existing antitrust laws. This argument was based
on an established Access Principle, which the Justice
Department explained as follows :
13 
See Statement of George W. Mitchell, Member of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Electronic Funds Transfer System. Hearings, pp. l-11.
14 
For a summary of the thrift industry’s comments on
the Federal Reserve Board’s proposals see “Fed Urged
to Move Cautiously on EFTS . . .”
28 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1985Antitrust law requires that those who control an
essential facility must grant access to it on reason-
able and non-discriminatory terms to all competi-
tors.
15
In the context of antitrust law, an “essential” fa-
cility is one that provides a significant competitive
advantage to any market participants that have direct
access to that facility. No alternatives to the Federal
Reserve’s ACH system existed at that time. More-
over, it was argued that because the Federal Reserve
did not charge explicit fees for these services, no
competing private sector alternative was likely to de-
velop.
16 The Justice Department’s view, therefore,
was that the ACH system operated by the Federal
Reserve was essential for purposes of antitrust law.
On these grounds, it was argued that thrift institu-
tions should be permitted direct access to ACH ser-
vices on equal terms with commercial banks. Like
thrift industry groups, the Justice Department fa-
vored the adoption of a system of nondiscriminatory
fees for these services.
The Justice Department’s position was apparently
based on the premise that thrifts should be permitted
to compete directly with commercial banks on equal
terms. As has already been noted, however, the regu-
latory structure existing at that time intentionally
discriminated between different types of financial in-
stitutions expressly to inhibit such competition. The
Justice Department was aware of the fact that thrifts
might enjoy certain competitive advantages as a re-
sult of these regulations, but argued that the exist-
ence of such advantages did not constitute sufficient
grounds under antitrust law to deny thrifts direct
access to an essential facility:
On the other hand, the fact that thrift institutions
may enjoy other regulatory or legal advantages
15 
Comments of the United States Department of Justice:
Proposed Amendment of Regulation J and Related
Issues (May 14, 1974).
16 
Earlier, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Fran-
cisco had proposed to establish a separate ACH system
for savings and loans. Both the Federal Reserve and the
Justice Department objected to this proposal. The
Federal Reserve’s opposition stemmed from its view that
there should be a single nationwide EFT network, oper-
ated by the Federal Reserve. See “Mitchell Would Bar
S&L Access to EFTS, Except Through Commercial
American Banker,  November 27, 1973. The
Justice Department favored leaving the market for EFTS
services to private sector competitors and so opposed any
entry from government agencies. A letter from Thomas
E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, to Garth Marston, Acting Chairman, Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, 1975 explained the Justice Depart-
ment’s opposition to the proposed FHLB System.
does not justify a denial of equal access to an auto-
mated clearing facility; thus, in a recent antitrust
case, the courts applied the bottleneck principle to
the transmission system of an investor-owned elec-
tric company, despite the fact that the “competi-
tors” gaining access were municipally owned elec-
tric systems who enjoyed various tax and other ad-
vantages. This decision was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court in February 1973.
17
The Resolution of the Access Policy Issue
The controversy over ACH access policy was fi-
nally resolved by a pair of antitrust suits brought
against the California and Rocky Mountain ACHs
by the Justice Department in 1977. A more liberal
access policy was instituted before then, however.
The Federal Reserve had adopted a policy that en-
couraged the admission of thrifts into the ACH as-
sociations it serviced a year earlier (although none of
these associations had adopted such a policy), and
had also instituted the direct delivery of ACH items
to thrifts.
18 In a related development, NYACH per-
mitted full membership and access for thrifts from
the time it was first organized in 1975.
In January of 1976, the Federal Reserve Board
modified its access guidelines to accommodate thrifts
that might become members of ACH associations
that it serviced. The new guidelines stated that
ACH deposits delivered to the Federal Reserve
could “. . . originate from any account having third-
party payment powers, e.g., savings, NOW, share
draft accounts.“
19 In contrast, earlier access guide-
lines had restricted authority to directly originate
17 
Donald I. Baker, “Antitrust and Automated Banking,”
The Banking Law Journal  90 (September 1973): 703-18.
Mr. Baker was Deputy Assistant Attorney General and
Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust Division
when this article was prepared. He also participated in
preparation of the Justice Department’s comments to the
Federal Reserve on the issue of access policy.
18 
The direct delivery of ACH items to thrifts was in-
stituted in 1975 as part of the Federal Reserve’s “interim
access guidelines.” Under these guidelines, thrifts that
received a sufficient number of ACH items and that were
located along existing check courier routes could receive
ACH items directly from the Federal Reserve. In addi-
tion, thrifts were-given permission to pick up items
directly from local Federal Reserve processing centers.
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
“Access to Federal Reserve Clearing and Settlement
Facilities: Proposed Policy,” Federal Register 40
(June 17, 1975): 25,641, and also Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, “Interim Guidelines for
Direct Deposit of Federal Payments,”  Federal Reserve
Bulletin  62 (January 1976): 66-67.
19 
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, “Collection of Checks and Other Items by
Federal Reserve Banks,” Federal Register 41 (Janu-
ary 21, 1976): 3,097-105.
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“. . . legislatively authorized to maintain demand
deposit accounts.“
20 In addition, language included
in the later guidelines appeared to encourage ACH
associations to adopt more liberal membership
policies.
21
The ABA resisted attempts to liberalize ACH ac-
cess policy, arguing, as before, that ACH associa-
tions should be permitted to determine access policy
for themselves and that only institutions legally au-
thorized to offer demand deposits should be permit-
ted to originate ACH transactions
22 The right of ac-
cess for thrift institutions was finally established
through two antitrust suits filed by the Justice De-
partment in 1977. The first of these suits was
brought against the Rocky Mountain ACH. The
second was against the California ACH. Both of
these organizations obtained their services from the
Federal Reserve. In both cases the Justice Depart-
ment argued that heavy Federal Reserve subsidies of
ACH services and the resulting absence of explicit
prices for these services effectively created local mo-
nopolies in this area. These subsidies, it was argued,
discouraged the emergence of a private sector com-
petitor and so turned these ACHs into essential fa-
cilities. Therefore, the denial of direct access to
thrifts placed those institutions at a competitive dis-
advantage with respect to commercial banks in vio-
lation of established antitrust laws. The Justice De-
partment won both suits, and soon thereafter all
ACH associations began to admit thrifts to mem-
bership.
23 These suits had no substantial effect on
Federal Reserve policies, however, since the access
20 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
“Access to the Federal Reserve Clearing and Settlement
Facilities.”
21 
This is reflected in the following passage: “In pro-
viding clearing and settlement servic for ACH associ-
ations, the Board anticipates that these services will be
made reasonably available on a comparable basis to
depository institutions having need for such services.”
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
“Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Re-
serve Banks.”
22 
Letter, Willis W. Alexander, Executive Vice President,
American Bankers Association to Theodore E. Allison,
Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, March 19, 1976. This letter was pub-
lished in  Federal Reserve Services,  Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 95 Cong. 1 Sess. (GPO, 1977), pp. 178-96.
23 
A more detailed account of these suits is contained in
Penny and Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer
Systems at 19-25.
guidelines adopted the year before had made explicit
arrangements for eventual thrift membership in
ACH associations.
As a result of these suits, the Justice Department's
position on the issues of pricing and access greatly
influenced the provisions dealing with those issues
finally included in the Monetary Control Act. As
with many of the issues involving deregulation, the
enactment of legislation dealing with such issues
only served to ratify earlier developments in the
marketplace.
III. ISSUES RELATED TO FEDERAL RESERVE
PRICING POLICY
Debate over Federal Reserve pricing policy first
surfaced in the early 1970s as a result of two related
sets of issues. The first concerned the competitive
and antitrust implications of Federal Reserve pricing
policy. The second set of issues arose as a result of
the growing Federal Reserve membership problem
and congressional concern over the expected cost
of legislative proposals put forward to solve this
problem.
Concern over the effects of Federal Reserve pric-
ing policy on market competition arose as a result of
its announcement of plans to  develop and operate a
comprehensive nationwide electronic funds transfer
(EFT) network. Although Federal Reserve in-
volvement in the development and operation of the
ACH system was actively encouraged by a large seg-
ment of the banking industry, it also resulted in de-
bate over the appropriate role of the Federal Re-
serve in the nation’s payments system. The develop-
ment of this new network was viewed by some as an
entry into new markets by the Federal Reserve.
Some bankers expressed concern that, unless the
Federal Reserve began to price its services explicitly,
private sector entry into these new markets would be
preempted. Separately, thrift industry complaints
regarding ACH access policy led to calls for the
adoption of a nondiscriminatory pricing system.
The membership problem experienced by the Fed-
eral Reserve during this period made the Board of
Governors hesitant to adopt such a policy, however.
In the end, Congress combined pricing policy reform
together with other measures designed to solve the
Federal Reserve’s membership problem in the final
version of the Monetary Control Act.
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Soon after the Federal Reserve System was estab-
lished, Reserve Banks made facilities available for the
transfer of funds between member bank reserve ac-
counts. Such transactions typically involved rela-
tively large amounts and, like direct transactions be-
tween private correspondent banks, initially utilized
either Western Union or Postal Telegraph facilities.
In 1918, the Federal Reserve established its own
Morse code system to provide for a more rapid and
secure transfer of funds between banks. Since then,
the system has been gradually updated. Fedwire, as
it came to be called, became the primary facility for
the transfer of funds in the federal funds market. In
addition, commercial banks developed a number of
private funds transfer networks that offered similar
services.
24
The Federal Reserve Act had authorized the Board
to regulate transfers of funds among Reserve banks
and to receive deposits from member banks. The
Board interpreted this authority as providing the
statutory basis for the operation of its own wire
funds transfer network.
25 In 1972, soon after MAPS
committee recommended the formation of a nation-
wide ACH network, the Federal Reserve announced
its own plans to develop and operate an integrated na-
tionwide EFT network.
26 The scope of this planned
network was broader than that of the network then
operated by the Federal Reserve in that it would pro-
vide facilities to process and transfer recurring ACH-
type transactions in addition to the large-dollar types
of transfers the Fed had offered throughout its his-
tory. There was also some discussion of using the
Federal Reserve network for supporting a retail na-
tionwide point-of-sale (POS) network.
There was a good deal of disagreement within the
banking industry on the need for the Federal Reserve
to expand its operations in the area of electronic pay-
ments systems. Many of the larger money center
24 
A description of Fedwire and other privately operated
funds transfer networks is presented in David Mengle,
“Daylight Overdrafts and Payments System Risks,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Review
71 (May/June 1985): 14-27.
25 
See “Federal Reserve Operations in Payment Mech-
anisms: A Summary,”  Federal Reserve Bulletin  62 (June
1976) : 481-89.
26 
“Evolution of the Payments Mechanism,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin 58 (December 1972) : 1009-12.
banks, which were also major correspondent banks,
voiced concerns that the Federal Reserve’s develop-
ment of a nationwide EFT network could preempt all
such private sector initiatives. The position finally
adopted by the ABA appears to have been designed
as a compromise between those bankers who favored
the planned expansion of the Federal Reserve’s EFT
network and others interested in expanding their
own profit-making operations. That compromise en-
dorsed the Fed’s involvement in the ACH system,
but also advocated the adoption of “. . . a pricing sys-
tem on a basis fully reflecting the costs which would
be incurred by a private sector effort . . .“
27 for any
new services it offered. This proposal was intended
to protect private-sector incentives to offer competing
services.
In addition to industry groups, the Justice Depart-
ment also favored the adoption of a system of com-
petitively-set prices for EFT services offered by the
Fed. The Antitrust Division’s comments to the Fed-
eral Reserve cited two principal reasons favoring the
adoption of such a pricing system. The first of these
reasons was connected with the issue of access policy.
Here, it was noted that antitrust law required the
adoption of a nondiscriminatory pricing system for
essential services provided to competing firms on the
grounds that: “A discriminatory pricing system can
be as substantial a bar to competition as exclusionary
ru1es.“
28 Additionally, the Justice Department also
expressed many of the same competitive concerns
voiced by financial industry groups; that is, that pri-
vate sector development of such systems might be
discouraged if the Federal Reserve continued to of-
fer these services at no explicit charge. To ensure
against such an outcome, the Federal Reserve was
urged to price its EFT services on the basis of fully
allocated costs and ‘. . . including an appropriate
allowance for capital costs.“
29 It was argued further
that such pricing concerns were tied to the issue of
access because the presence of competing suppliers
would lessen the likelihood that any one such sup-
plier’s services could become “essential.”
27 
See “Fed Urged to Move Cautiously on EFTS . . .”
28 
Comments of the United States Department of Justice,
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In response to these events the Federal Reserve
Board announced its intent to establish a price sche-
dule for its check-clearing and ACH services in Jan-
uary 1976, together with its liberalized access pro-
posals. However, the Board continued to be con-
cerned about the impact the adoption of such a pric-
ing system might have on its worsening membership
problem and so was careful to explain that: “In de-
veloping the pricing schedule, consideration would be
given to the burden of required reserves maintained
by member banks.“
30 No timetable for the imple-
mentation of this pricing system was given, and in
the end such a pricing system was adopted only after
passage of the Monetary Control Act and the resolu-
tion of the membership problem.
Serious consideration of the pricing issue emerged
in Congress in 1977 as part of the debate over legis-
lation intended to alleviate the Federal Reserve’s
membership problem. Congressional attention ini-
tially centered on the costs of providing these ser-
vices and the resulting loss of revenue to the Treas-
ury, however, rather than the competitive and anti-
trust problems that concerned industry groups.
Legislation on Pricing
The Federal Reserve had long proposed the in-
stitution of universal reserve requirements as a
means of solving its membership problem. However,
such measures proved to be very unpopular among
nonmember institutions who lobbied vigorously
against them. As a result, legislation granting the
Federal Reserve the authority to pay explicit interest
on member bank reserves came under consideration.
Provisions extending such authority were included
in Senate bill S.1664, which was submitted by the
Carter administration in the spring of 1977. It con-
tained two main provisions. First, it permitted all
depository institutions nationwide to offer NOW
accounts to consumers and imposed uniform reserve
requirements on those accounts. Second, the bill
granted the Federal Reserve permission to begin
paying interest on reserves. The bill also contained
language explicitly authorizing the Federal Reserve
to provide payments services to all depository insti-
tutions that offered NOW accounts.
Senate bill S.1664 was never enacted, largely be-
cause of the anticipated cost of the interest payments
it would have permitted. These concerns were noted
30 
Board of Governors, “Collection of Checks and Other
Items by Federal Reserve Banks,” p. 3,098.
by Senator Proxmire in the course of the hearings
held to consider the bill:
Frankly, I am troubled about. the proposal to per-
mit the Federal Reserve to pay up to $600 million
a year to the Nation’s larger banks in the form of
interest on reserve balances . . . . Moreover, the
legislation fails to direct the Fed to begin charging
for the services currently valued at $300 million,
which it provides free of charge to member banks.
31
It was widely understood that the services the
Federal Reserve supplied to its member banks served
as a means of paying implicit interest on required
reserves. Both the Treasury and Congress therefore
appeared to expect that the extension of this authority
would be accompanied by the institution of a pricing
system by the Federal Reserve.
32 However, the
Board was hesitant to commit itself to an exact date
for the release of a proposed fee schedule or to set a
specific timetable for the enactment of a general
pricing policy before final action was taken to resolve
the membership problem.
33
In addition to dealing with the Federal Reserve’s
membership problem, the Justice Department’s anti-
trust suits, which were successfully concluded at
about the same time, put pressure on Congress to act
on the problem of access policy. Members of Con-
gress were very aware that over half the Federal
Reserve’s operating budget was devoted to the pro-
vision of payments services, and the prospect of
further requests for these services by nonmember
institutions promised to place further demands on
that budget. Soon after the hearings on S.1664 were
held, Senator Proxmire organized a separate set of
oversight hearings to review the role of the Federal
Reserve in the payments system and the issue of
pricing those services.
34
In the course of these hearings, many representa-
tives of the banking industry were asked for their
views on pricing and the appropriate role of the
31 
Opening Statement of Senator Proxmire, in NOW
Accounts, Federal Reserve Membership and Related
Issues,  Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95 Cong., 1 Sess. (GPO,
1977), p. 3.
32 
See, for example, Statement of W. Michael Blumen-
thal, Secretary of the Treasury, in NOW Accounts,
Federal Reserve Membership and Related Issues, pp.
33 
See, for example, Statement of Arthur F. Burns, Chair-
man of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, in  NOW Accounts, Federal Reserve Member-
ship and Related Issues,  pp. 26-59, especially p. 58.
34 
Federal Reserve Services,  Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
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sentatives of major correspondent banks and other
potential competitors favored a greatly reduced oper-
ational presence for the Federal Reserve. Others
who testified, however, including representatives
from a number of smaller banks as well as thrift
industry and credit union groups, supported the
maintenance of the Federal Reserve’s broad opera-
tional role in the payments system. While there
appeared to be no consensus on the exact services
the Federal Reserve should be permitted to offer,
there was universal agreement among market partici-
pants on the subject of pricing. It was widely ac-
knowledged that private sector incentives to offer
competing services should be protected and that this
was best done by having the Federal Reserve adopt a
pricing policy that would foster such competition.
Pricing was also favored as a means of promoting
economic efficiency in the provision of payments
services. In the absence of pricing, financial institu-
tions that received Federal Reserve services had little
incentive to conserve their use of such services or to
encourage the use of the potentially more efficient
emerging EFT services as a substitute for paper
checks. However, while these latter economic argu-
ments were recognized and discussed briefly during
the oversight hearings, it was clear that the other
related issues, those concerning the ultimate cost to
the Treasury of the Fed’s payments operations and
the problem of fostering private-sector competition,
dominated congressional attention. All future legis-
lative proposals dealing with the Federal Reserve’s
membership problem would also address the issues
of pricing and competition.
A year later, in May of 1978, Representative
Stanton of Ohio introduced another bill, H.R. 12706,
to permit the Federal Reserve to pay interest on
reserves. The Stanton bill differed from earlier legis-
lative proposals in that it also contained language
explicitly requiring the Federal Reserve to set prices
for all its payments services:
. . . established on the basis of all direct and in-
direct costs actually incurred in providing the
services priced, including overhead, and an alloca-
tion of imputed costs that take into account the
taxes that would have been paid and the return on
capital that would have been provided had the
payment services been furnished by a private busi-
ness firm.35
35 
Federal Reserve Membership Act of 1978, H.R.12706,
in  Monetary Control and the Membership Problem,
Hearings before the House Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs, 95 Cong. 2 Sess. (GPO, 1978),
pp. 13-17.
The bill explicitly authorized the Federal Reserve to
continue offering its existing line of payments ser-
vices and also permitted it to offer new payments
services, “. . . including but not limited to payment
services that effectuate the wire transfer of funds.“
36
Any new services offered by the Federal Reserve
were also required to be explicitly priced according to
the requirements set forth in the act. The bill also
addressed the access policy issue. Provisions con-
tained in that legislative proposal required the Fed-
eral Reserve to make its payments services available
to all depository institutions on the same terms.
37
Separately, an amendment proposed by Representa-
tive Reuss (then Chairman of the House Banking
Committee) would have limited the gross amount
of interest the Federal Reserve would be permitted
to pay out to the total of the profits it earned from its
payments services plus any profits earned on loans
made through the discount window.
38 H.R. 12706
was not passed.
In the end, the House Banking Committee reported
out a new bill, H.R. 14072, that dropped provisions
authorizing the payment of interest on reserves and
instead imposed universal reserve requirements on
all commercial banks. The pricing provisions of the
Stanton bill were carried over substantially intact,
but included a number of new provisions giving the
Federal Reserve somewhat more flexibility in setting
its prices. As before, the Federal Reserve would be
required to set its prices sufficient to recover all its
costs, including an allowance for costs that would
be incurred by a private sector competitor, but new
language permitted these costs to be recovered “over
the long run.“
39 Additional changes permitted the




Of course, legal provisions such as this one, which re-
quire the adoption of nondiscriminatory access and pric-
ing policies, do not necessarily require that all purchasers
be charged the same price under all conditions. Price
discrimination arises when price differentials charged to
different purchasers are unrelated to underlying differ-
ences in the cost of supply. Thus, the Federal Reserve
can charge institutions that are more costly to service
(because they are remotely situated, for example) a high-
er price than it charges other institutions without violat-
ing the requirements of the Monetary Control Act. For
a more detailed discussion of price discrimination, see
F. M. Scherer,  Industrial Market Structure and Econo-
mic Performance 2nd ed. (Houghton Mifflin Company,
1980), chap. 21.
38 
See Opening Statement of Chairman Henry S. Reuss,
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs,  Monetary Control and the Membership Problem,
Hearings, pp. 34-53.
39 
Federal Reserve Act Amendments of 1978, H.R. 14072,
ibid, pp. 509-22.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 33recovery requirements when it was deemed to be in
the public interest to do so.
This same language was later included in H.R. 7,
The Monetary Control Act of 1979, which passed in
the House of Representatives the following year.
After a joint committee meeting, this bill was com-
bined with a bill passed in the Senate to form the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980. The final version of the bill
contained only minor changes in the language dealing
with the pricing of Federal Reserve services.
40
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Monetary Control Act radically changed the
terms governing the Federal Reserve’s participation
in the operation of the nation’s payment system. This
change was brought about because of a number of
related developments arising in the decade before the
act was passed that caused Congress to reevaluate the
Federal Reserve’s role in the payments system.
First, the Federal Reserve’s involvement in the
development and operation of automated clearing-
houses, while encouraged by a large segment of the
banking industry, also raised questions concerning
which services the Fed should provide for the banking
industry. A number of market participants, notably
the larger money center banks and private clearing-
houses, viewed this action as an expansion by the
Federal Reserve into new markets. These latter
groups voiced concerns that a large-scale expansion
of Federal Reserve service offerings could preempt
private sector initiatives, and lobbied to have the
Fed’s activities in this area limited.
Separately, the deregulation of the thrift industry
that began in 1970 resulted in the request for direct
access to ACH services. Since ACH technology was
new, no real alternatives to the ACH network oper-
ated by the Federal Reserve were available. The
banking industry determined the conditions of access
to this network, however, and this group set the
enactment of legislation that would eliminate many of
the regulatory advantages then enjoyed by the thrift
industry as a condition of direct access. Since the
Federal Reserve had a major role in operating this
system, ACH access became tied to the broader issue
of Federal Reserve access policy.
40 
See Raymond Natter, “Legislative Intent Regarding
Pricing of Services by the Federal Reserve Board,” in
Federal Reserve Competition with the Private Sector in
Check Clearing and Other Services,  H.R. Rept. No. 98-
676, 98 Cong. 2 Sess. (GPO, 1984), pp. 81-91.
The Justice Department supported the thrift in-
dustry’s request for direct access, arguing that anti-
trust law required equal access be granted to all
competitors. In 1977, the Justice Department secured
access for thrifts by successfully arguing that direct
access to ACH services was “essential” for purposes
of antitrust law.
These developments posed problems that were not
anticipated when the Federal Reserve Act was orig-
inally enacted. Before thrifts began to offer third-
party payments services commercial banks were the
only institutions requiring access to clearing facilities
such as those operated by the Federal Reserve, and
any bank desiring direct access to the Federal Re-
serve’s services always had the option of becoming a
member of the System. Membership in the Federal
Reserve, however, meant bearing the costs associated
with the System’s reserve requirements. The thrift
industry therefore opposed access conditioned on
some form of Federal Reserve membership. The
ruling subsequently obtained by the Justice Depart-
ment granted thrifts access to ACH services without
imposing the costs of membership.
At this time the Federal Reserve was already ex-
periencing an acute membership problem because of
the relatively stringent reserve requirements imposed
on its member banks. Since the Fed was effectively
prohibited from paying explicit interest on these
reserves, its payments services served as a means of
paying implicit interest. Therefore, the adoption of a
nondiscriminatory price schedule, as the Justice De-
partment argued was necessary under antitrust law,
threatened to further exacerbate the Federal Re-
serve’s membership problem.
With these problems in mind, it is easy to under-
stand why legislative provisions addressing the issues
of access and pricing were included as part of a larger
package of reforms intended to alleviate the Federal
Reserve’s membership problem. The Monetary
Control Act lowered reserve requirements for
member banks and extended these same reserve
requirements to all depository institutions offering
transactions accounts, thus eliminating the previous
discriminatory treatment of member banks. By itself,
lowering average reserve requirements for member
banks could be expected to result in a reduction of the
revenues the Federal Reserve earned on these non-
interest-bearing reserves and subsequently paid to
the Treasury. Extending these new reserve require-
ments to nonmember depository institutions, how-
ever, mitigated this revenue loss. Nevertheless, on
net, the lower average reserve requirements autho-
34 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1985rized by the act were expected to result in a net
revenue loss to the Treasury.
41 Revenues earned by
the Federal Reserve from the sale of its services were
expected to offset a portion of these other lost reve-
nues. Moreover, the adoption of a nondiscriminatory
fee schedule permitted equal access to be granted to
all depository institutions interested in receiving
Federal Reserve services. (The act also granted
access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window to
all institutions maintaining transactions accounts.)
Finally, since this last provision would put the Fed-
eral Reserve in more direct competition with private
correspondent banks, it was required to set its prices
based on all direct and indirect costs, including an
allowance for a return to capital that a private sector
competitor would have earned in supplying  such
services.
Federal Reserve pricing has stimulated the growth
of private clearinghouses as well as giving corre-
spondent banks a greater incentive to process more of
their own payments transactions. At the same time,
nonmember depository institutions gained direct ac-
cess to the Federal Reserve’s clearing network. On
net, the increase in private sector competition has
resulted in the Federal Reserve losing some of its
market share in the area of check-clearing services,
although not in all other service lines.
42 In this
sense, the Monetary Control Act has limited the
Federal Reserve’s role in the payments system.
In other ways, though, the act authorized an ex-
pansion of the Federal Reserve’s role. Although the
Fed must now compete more directly with private
sector suppliers, it is no longer limited in offering its
services to member banks. In addition, the Federal
Reserve is now authorized to offer any new payments
services, provided that the fees charged for such
services are sufficient to cover all costs, including
imputed private sector costs. The original Federal
Reserve Act was written long before the most recent
wave of technological innovation in the telecommuni-
cations industry. Those provisions authorized the
Federal Reserve to clear checks and to otherwise
effect the transfer of funds for member banks, but
the extent to which the Fed was authorized to offer
new services based on new technologies was unclear.
This issue was resolved by the Monetary Control
Act.
41 
On the basis of bank deposits reported for the month
of December 1977, this net revenue loss was estimated at
$155.6 million per year. See  Monetary Control Act of
1979, H.R. Rept. 830, 96 Cong. 1 Sess. (GPO, 1979),
pp. 5-6.
42 
See David B. Humphrey, “Resource Use in Federal
Reserve Check and ACH Operations After Pricing,”
Journal of Bank Research 16 (Spring 1985): 45-53.
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